The aim of the paper is to discuss and to provide evidence for the existence of pecuniary knowledge externalities, considered here as the main cause of positive disequilibrium experience by downstream producers. This last effect, confirmed by the empirical analysis here performed, contrasts the postulates of the model of growth through creative destruction due to Aghion & Howitt (1992) , where downstream producers remain very much passive in front of new technological knowledge externally generated.
Introduction
A high uncertainty accompanying innovative activities has been extensively recognized in the incumbent economic literature so far. The low probability of success of the research activity, relatively long time periods over which the innovative results are to be expected, the uncertainty triggering the implementation of inventions, and their transformation into innovations, as well as the manifold risks coming from the competitors operating in the innovative environment -all these elements contribute to a nontrivial nature of innovative activity. Moreover, the unpredictability of the results of innovations makes it difficult to accept the study of the process in a standard framework of maximization. The argument has been recently treated by Antonelli and Scellato (2008) . They develop the concept of creative reaction as a set of conditions including incentives and opportunities necessary to provide an appropriate environment for intentional decision-making. The last element, instead, is the generating power of new knowledge, and consequently, of new technologies. Most importantly, the aforementioned necessary conditions for the creation of novelty appear on the out-of-equilibrium path.
Extending further the complexity argument, a more general view of the innovation process leads to consider spillovers accompanying the exchange of knowledge between producers. A general distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities has been widely accepted in the incumbent theoretical discussion. In particular, in the field of the new growth theory and in the theory of location of innovative activities across space, the existence of external effects in an innovative context has been illustrated as a free of charge benefit deriving from the generation of new knowledge. These technological externalities derive from a direct interaction between producers, as opposed to pecuniary externalities which require the price system in order to exert their indirect, i.e. market mediated influence.
Nevertheless, these two kinds of well-known and extensively discussed externalities do not fully exhaust the whole spectrum of effects occurring when new knowledge is generated and made available to the market. Often undervalued here is the fact that new technological knowledge obtained from external sources by downstream producers is implemented in the further generation of knowledge and eventually in the production of goods by means of dedicated activities. In that process of knowledge implementation downstream users experience an externality permitting them to exploit externally generated knowledge at 3 favorable cost conditions. This effect, labeled as pecuniary knowledge externalities, is put on the focus of the present theoretical discussion and its evidence is studied in an empirical exercise regarding the European economy.
More precisely, the concept is confronted with the main results of the model of growth by Aghion and Howitt (1992) The analysis conducted here is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the assumptions, the main results and the empirical treatment offered so far to the model of growth through creative destruction by Aghion and Howitt (1992) . Moreover, the definition of pecuniary externalities is recalled from the seminal work of Scitovsky (1954) . Finally, the concept of pecuniary externalities will be adequately restricted to the case in which these effects provoke repercussions in the decision to give rise to the new internal technological knowledge generated downstream with the implementation of the external sources of knowledge. For this reason the concept of pecuniary knowledge externalities will be introduced. Section 3, dedicated to the empirical analysis, describes the methodology, presents the data and comments on the results. The last section summarizes the results of the empirical model in the view of the theoretical motivation.
Theory and motivation
The evolution of the growth theory starting from the second half of the XX century brought a considerable passage from exogenous growth models, in which an economy is supposed to grow only in the short run according to parameters changing outside of the model, to models of growth based on mechanisms of long run growth endogenously determined.
The main reason why neoclassical models were not able to endogenize the growth process is the assumption of constant returns to scale and decreasing returns to each factor.
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This assumption was gradually removed by means of a wider definition of capital, including human components, to which diminishing returns weren´t applied any more. However, the pure redefinition of capital was still an insufficient improvement in this sense, as technological change continued to be assumed fixed and given exogenously. Only subsequently, the possibility to generate new ideas inside the research sector permitted for a satisfactory endogenization of the state and progress of technology into the growth process.
This appeared as a more powerful method of escaping from diminishing returns to scale than it was in the case of a pure re-definition of capital. Nevertheless, some conceptual problems, regarding in particular nonrival nature of new knowledge, were still hampering this new line of treatment. Finally, the contribution of Romer (1990) and Aghion & Howitt (1992) introduced some elements of imperfect competition, permitting in that way to construct a satisfactory model of growth with endogenous technological change.
The model of growth through creative destruction by Aghion & Howitt (1992) is based on vertical interactions between producers. In that way upstream producers benefit from new ideas generated in the research sector and use them to produce innovative intermediate goods which are subsequently supposed to replace the old inputs in the production of final goods.
Finally, as these intermediate goods are employed in the process of production of the final goods, technological progress is transferred in the way to influence the economy at large. The introduction of novelties, their transformation into a productive result upstream and the implementation of innovative inputs in the production process downstream is, ultimately, considered as the exclusive source and explanation of economic growth at the system level.
This functioning of the filiéré, where successful innovations push the old solutions out of the market, has been based on the process of creative destruction, first introduced and described by Schumpeter (1942) .
In their book on the economics of growth published in 1998 Aghion & Howitt discuss several shortcomings of the model, regarding in particular the assumption on the scaled-up structure of the economy, the description of knowledge as the parameter A, the disregard towards institutions and transaction costs, the way of representing the research sector. The general structure and the dynamics of the model remain very much the same with no further consideration over the possibility that some external effects may hamper the stability of the model.
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As it has been mentioned before, as an important consequence of the generation of knowledge implies in the model by Aghion and Howitt innovative producers absorb new technologies at no cost and so benefit from technological externalities. Moreover, as argued by Antonelli (2008) the model comprises also the occurrence of pecuniary externalities, where innovative intermediates are offered to the final good producers at a price lower than in equilibrium. Nevertheless, in such a context downstream producers remain passive players and do not experience further consequences on their innovativeness. If, instead, we assume that downstream producers implement this externally generated technological knowledge in an internal process of knowledge generation, this offers a space for a further category of externalities, namely, pecuniary knowledge externalities (PKE). Consequently, through the influence on the growth rate of TFP downstream, the appearance of PKE may considerably change the main steady state results of the model.
In particular, it has been often argued that the growth rates of TFP are interdependent between sectors 1 . Here, we argue that these dependences go through intermediate goods transactions, registered in Input-Output tables. These intermediate transactions enable downstream producers to acquire innovative inputs and thus incorporated in them externally generated knowledge. Downstream producers enjoy not only a better quality of production inputs, but they react creatively in front of this external source of knowledge, but implement it internally by means of dedicated activities of learning and of interacting with upstream innovators. In this process of implementation, downstream knowledge users experience an externality, namely, pecuniary knowledge externality, as the costs necessary to adapt new knowledge from external sources are lower than the equilibrium conditions would imply in case knowledge would possess characteristics of a normal economic good. In that way, downstream professional users become innovators themselves. This appears as a new element in the context of the modern growth models: the operating of PKE brings a radical change of downstream producers innovativeness and this new source of dynamics is likely to provoke instability in the steady state equilibrium postulated in the growth models so far. 
Pecuniary versus technological externalities
The initial contribution of Meade (1952) has been recognized as a crucial and decisive point of departure for the further development of economic thinking in the area of external effects. His original analysis concerned the distinction between externalities that are generated by "unpaid factors" and those that instead raise due to "creating atmosphere". However, Meade himself justified only partly any further extension of the concept, by saying that "external economies or diseconomies may not fall into either of these precise divisions and may contain features of both of them." Nevertheless, the discussion that followed his original contribution pointed out the importance of the distinction between technological and pecuniary externalities. Following this line of theoretical discussion, the main definitions due to Scitovsky (1954) concerning both technological and pecuniary externalities will be recalled. The crucial need in this sense will be to depict a clear conceptual distinction between the two. This is essential in order to introduce in a second step a new concept of externalities, namely, pecuniary knowledge externalities. It will be stressed that their influence might have important consequences on the results postulated in the model of growth through creative destruction.
In general terms, external effects, positive or negative, will occur in all these instances, in which the activity of one firm 2 is influenced, directly or through market mechanisms, by another firm or a group of firms. This formulation is applicable, both to technological and pecuniary external economies, as both are related to all these effects that a firm does not experience exclusively due to its individual activity.
In technical terms, following the definition given by Meade (1952) , external economies occur when circumstances external to the firm operate in the way that the productive result of a firm, say   , ;
where F is the production function. According to Scitovsky, the definition just recalled is strictly related to the concept of direct interdependences among producers, which in the convincement of Scitovsky are the only ones compatible with the theory of general equilibrium. Indeed, the main feature of direct interdependences, analogously to the definition of Meade, is that the productive result of individual producer, except for the dependency from his own inputs, may be influenced by the activity of other firms. Going further, because the effects of the influence are to be observed on the production function, Scitovsky attribute them the label of "technological external economies".
Originally, the concept of technological externalities -and the parental concept of knowledge spillovers -builds on the Marshallian description of dynamic interactions occurring in industrial districts where technological knowledge is a production input spilling freely in the atmosphere. Communication, transaction and implementation costs arise neither in the acquisition nor in the use of knowledge and no market mechanism is required in order to make it available to the users. Moreover, once new knowledge is generated, it circulates in the production system without implying interactions between knowledge producers and knowledge users. Such a view of knowledge as a public or quasi-public good has been applied in the methodological work by Griliches (1979 Griliches ( , 1992 ) and adopted in the most influential models of the new growth theory (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossmann and Helpman, 1995; Jones, 1995) .
Opposing this notion of externalities, Scitovsky defines another category of external effects, the so called pecuniary externalities. He starts by observing that, generally, external effects have been often invoked in the theory of industrialization of underdeveloped countries as a complementary part to the equilibrium assumptions. In other words, externalities has been treated as a residual collection of all these cases in which the applicability of the conditions for an optimum allocation of investment funds in a wider context of imperfect competition has been difficult to maintain. The lack of a formal treatment in this context has been repaired by Scitovsky who managed to infer from available examples and discussions a rigorous definition of externalities, in which the category of pecuniary externalities is conceptually included.
According to Scitovsky, externalities are met whenever the profits of a producer result not only from his individual activity, but are also affected by actions of other producers. In analytical terms, this can be written in the following way
where P 1 expresses profits of a firm that are influenced not only by its own output   This definition of externalities is an even broader version of the definition due to Meade, as it includes both direct and indirect interdependences between firms. The relevant difference lays in the nature of the mechanisms driving these effects. While in the first case, interdependences directly affect production functions via technological spillovers between firms, on the contrary, the indirect interdependences are supposed to occur through mechanisms external (and so indirect) to the productive activities of the firm, and in particular these mechanisms that are driven by the market. This last type of indirect interdependences, giving raise to changing profitability results of the producer, is commonly recognized to be the cause of pecuniary externalities. The most common market mechanism that we can think about in this context is the price system.
In more practical terms, if an investment in an industry -or in a single firm -constitutes a source of improvement of its productive capacities and through the usual market mechanisms this new technological improvement implicitly or explicitly is integrated as a part of transactions, this will likely cause pecuniary effects. In the first place, the opportunity created by a convenient acquisition of innovative intermediate inputs will have obvious effects of reduction in production costs of the producer. Consequently, this improvement of the productive capacity will ultimately lead to lower output prices and thus will result in benefits for industries using the output as an intermediate input in their production as well as for the final consumers. Here the list of potential chain effects and actors influenced by pecuniary effects is not exhausted: an improvement of the productive capacities of an industry may have further positive vertical or horizontal effects, i.e. effects experienced by an industry producing complementary goods, or by an industry producing a substitute good with respect to the innovating industry. The list may be further adequately completed with not rare cases of pecuniary external diseconomies that occur each time a producer, due to imperfect appropriability of technological knowledge, suffers from not remunerated parts of his activity or some aspects of the activity of other producers provoke a harm on his economic results. Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) , for instance, provide an example of negative pecuniary effects in which a firm producing an additional unit of output and, thus, marginally lowering price of its product provokes harm on competitive firms. However, this negative effect 9 regards competitors producing substitutive goods, while those supplying a complementary goods, due to demand-driven effects, experience a positive impact. Moreover, the strength and persistence of these spillovers do not need to follow any standardized pattern and will potentially differ according to particular characteristics of each industry. The main point here, however, is not to discuss all possible cases and their extensions, but rather to make it clear that the determinant element classifying an externality as pecuniary is its positive or negative impact on profits (or income) occurring through some market mechanism. In this sense, pecuniary externalities are considered as occurring indirectly, mediated through some mechanism that is external to the production activity and not through interactions that directly concern technical conditions in the production of involved firms.
Pecuniary knowledge externalities
Having put light on the important differences characterizing both concepts of externalities, pecuniary and technological ones, the central argument in the present theoretical discussion can be introduced. As it has been already mentioned, the phenomenon of pecuniary competitive impulses, will be forced to promote adjustments, in order either to maneuver the environment in a desired direction or to catch up with occurring changes. In this sense, indisputable seems the fact that "disequilibrium, rather than equilibrium, is the main characteristic of an evolutionary economic system" 4 , of which pecuniary knowledge externalities constitute inseparable part. Originally, the attribution of a particular importance to input-output linkages in determining the speed and the direction of economic development has been made in the pioneering contribution by Leontief (1936) , later confirmed also by Hirschman (1958) . In the recent years, the contribution by Ciccone (2002) The next section will present the model. Section 3.2 describes the data used in the estimation, while section 3.3 presents the results and the methodology followed in the estimation procedure.
The basic set up
The aim of the model is to investigate the existence and the strength of the external effects, having on their basis transfers and implementation of externally generated 
or in a compacted form
where [B] is the vector of coefficients and
is the transposed vector of explanatory variables, each given by the product between the expenditure coefficient and the growth rate of total factor productivity for each upstream sector j, in country k, at time t. The expenditure coefficient family, , in the sense that for the year, say, 1995 is taken the coefficient from that year, together with the TFP growth rate over the period 1994 -1995. In this way, it is assumed that innovative inputs are immediately available on the market and can be acquired by downstream users. Two control variables are included, namely, the rate of change of wages in sector i, as well as the level of expenditures in research and development 5 in that same sector. These two variables are supposed to control for possible influences on the growth rate of TFP driven by effect that are not considered in the method of calculation of the TFP growth rate, but that may play some role on the TFP dynamics. Indeed, the growth rate of total factor productivity has been obtained from the Thörnquist-Theil Divisia index:
. Being constructed as a residual from a constant returns production function, the index does not skip all kinds of influences, other than these coming from upgraded productivity of labor and capital and, thus, influences that do not enter any of the two subtracting terms related to the usual production factors. Among these influences, implementation and further knowledge generation is expected to be considerably influenced by pecuniary knowledge effects. As it has been already described before, the main contribution of PKE consists in enabling downstream producers to implement externally 5 Here the level of expenditure in R&D has been considered. However, would be also possible to consider the influence of the change in the level of the R&D expenditure as a factor having some impact on the dynamics of the TFP. generated technological knowledge into their internal process of knowledge generation at costs lower than in equilibrium. As a consequence of this externality, the downstream sector i is able to generate an innovative output and experiences a positive dynamics of TFP. This is the mechanism on which equation (3) has been built. It is aimed to grasp the dynamics provoked by relevant market interactions and, in particular, these resulting in technological influences between knowledge producers and knowledge professional users.
More precisely, the dynamics of TFP of the sector i is a function not merely of direct influences connected with changes in TFP of upstream sectors, but more precisely of the indirect technological influence coming as a consequence of the acquisition of innovative intermediate inputs. For that reason, the rate of change of TFP of each upstream sector j has been accompanied by the corresponding expenditure coefficient from Input-Output tables.
The estimation of equation (3) without further robustness analysis runs the risk of being too general to prove the main argument. Indeed, as the main equation is constructed in the way to grasp the simultaneous effect of technological impact occurring through transactions, nothing permits us to exclude a priori that this effect is driven by one of the two elementary forces and thus the simultaneity that is crucial for the main argument to hold would run the risk of losing its relevance. To diminish that risk, the estimation framework is enriched by two additional equations. 
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In analytical terms the two additional equations may be represented in the following way:
with the variables as defined before.
Data
In convert the tables from current to constant values. For some countries, however, the data on deflators were missing and consequently it was necessary to take them from the corresponding national statistical offices.
The estimation procedure and the main empirical results
The estimation method of equation (3) has been first based on the fixed effect model in the panel data framework. In this way the individual effect, the sector level effect, is excluded from the estimation by first averaging the explanatory variables and then subtracting the mean from the data. Furthermore, as the correlation coefficient obtained in the estimation with the fixed effect method appeared to be relatively low, the random effect has been estimated as well. In the next step, the Hausman test, permitting to choose a better estimation method between fixed and random effect, has been made. The two additional equations, (6) and (7), have been estimated with the fixed effect method. (3). The fixed effect model appeared to be consistent. However, the Hausman test was unable to reject the null, so that the efficient random effect model prevailed over the fixed effect method. Country dummies were included in the analysis and appeared to be insignificant.
In general, the results show the evidence that in the case of some sectors the linkages through which they are related to the rest of the economy and numerous influences that they exercise on the TFP dynamics may play a relevant role. In particular, sectors for which the regression results according to random effect model offers a particularly strong support for this hypothesis include, among manufacturing sectors, the food, beverages and tobacco industry; textiles and textile products; wood and products of wood; chemical and fuel products; basic metals and fabricated metal products; machinery and equipment; electrical and optical equipment; transport equipment; manufacturing nec, and among services, electricity, gas and water supply; wholesale and retail trade as well as financial intermediation. Not surprisingly, the list of sectors just mentioned includes some that are of a particular importance in generating and providing the rest of the system with new technological knowledge. This is true both for the majority of European economies and for the United
States. In fact -rather in the past, but still maintaining an important role -mechanical engineering, electricity and electrical devices, and in the recent decades especially information technologies are an example of these knowledge-intensive sectors that are crucial in determining national innovative capabilities and in transmitting positive influences on the production, imitation and most of all on the innovation processes in the economic system at large.
Also chemical industry, and in particular pharmaceutical production, is another broadly examined case study for which the recent literature found rather a strong evidence supporting its influential innovative character, fast growth of TFP and correlated positive repercussions on the rest of the economy. Many studies, among which the one by Arora and Gambarella (1990) , underline the role of significant technological advances pioneered in genetic engineering that exert, in turn, a considerable influence on technological insight of the whole chemical industry and, in particular, on pharmaceutical producers. This provides an evidence of spillover effects inside the chemical industry. Analogously, the results of the regression here presented confirm that thanks to the production of new drugs, animal and plant agricultural products, as well as of new and better qualities of other chemical products, many other sectors, like agriculture, machinery or health services, benefit from the high innovative potential originated in the chemical industry. Similarly, machinery production, as well as electrical and optical equipment -that last including among others the production of office, accounting and computing machinery -as well as medical, precision and optical instruments, all connected with an intensified use of ICT technologies and innovative softwares, are to be included in the group of these industries for which the results appear to be reasonably significant and, thus, in support of the basic intuition.
In this area, an important contribution is due to Jorgenson (2001) A particular attention deserves financial intermediation services. The results here obtained confirm the evidence from many past studies that better developed and more efficient financial services are an indisputable component influencing the growth performance of the economic system. They constitute an important source of improvements in the way of doing business and also through innovative financial instruments they reduce constraints faced by investors, innovators and generally by producers. The right efficiency dynamics in the financial intermediation is a condition for a positive influence, on the one hand, on the savings rates, and on the other hand, on the investment decisions, ultimately resulting in technological innovations occurring in the economy at large (Levin, 2004) .
Robustness analysis
The estimation of equation (3) 
The results of this regression, shown in Table ( 3.3.) , illustrate that also on average the joined effect of transactions and of the upstream-downstream technological influence is considerable and strongly supported by the data. Note: ** accepted at 5% Now, as it has been mentioned already earlier in this section, the analysis requires some additional and in a sense essential steps in order to strengthen and provide a rigorous proof of the main argument. Two additional estimations, presented in equations (6) and (7), are particularly helpful in interpreting the previous results consistently. Table ( 3.4.) offers the summary results of the estimation from equation (6) previously introduced.
Both the F test on the overall performance of estimated coefficients and the R 2 statistics reveal that the explanatory variables have a rather poor explaining power over the sector level growth rate of TFP. In economic terms this would suggest that pure technological spillovers cannot be considered as the main force driving the process of upgrading of the productive 23 capacities in the user sectors. Moreover, no sector, especially from the group of sectors that appeared to have a significant role in exercising influences on the economic system, as shown in the previous estimation, confirmed to be able to exercise any kind of influence by means of the pure sectoral TFP dynamics, disconnected from any market mechanism. Note: ** -accepted at 5%
In general, relative standard errors result to be much lower in the case of equation (3) than the corresponding values obtained from the regression of the pure TFP growth rates, appearing in support of equation (3). This, once again confirms that the latter estimation, on the contrary to the former one, cannot be considered as satisfactory and thus that the acceptable hypothesis is the one that recognizes the intersectoral technological influences coming from the market transactions.
In an analogous manner, the fixed effect model has been applied to estimate the second subsidiary equation (eq. 7), which analyses the influence of the expenditure coefficients of each single sector j on the growth rate of TFP of sector i (Tab. 3.6). Here, the estimation results are slightly better than these obtained from equation (6), but still not satisfactory enough to be accepted as binding. Only in the case of electrical and optical equipment industry the coefficient appeared to be significant. However, for all the other sectors the estimation results are not favorable. In this manner it is also shown that transactions by themselves, without considering the underlying transfer of technological knowledge from upstream to downstream producers do not have any explanatory power. knowledge. This is also to say that the satisfactory estimation results obtained from the main equation detect the operating of pecuniary knowledge externalities that are the driving force of the growth process at the system level. Moreover, the second and the third estimation from the robustness analysis, being not significant, have confirmed the intuition that the transfer of technological knowledge cannot be considered as a process disconnected from underlying interactions between upstream knowledge suppliers and downstream knowledge users. On the contrary, intermediate transactions of innovative components are followed by dedicated activities of support accompanying innovative users in the process of knowledge assimilation.
Especially the poor results of the equation (6) contradict the importance of pure technological spillovers, emphasized strongly in the previous literature. All this confirms the relevance of pecuniary knowledge externalities that enter into the planning strategies regarding the production activity. In that way they are crucial component in determining the strength and the direction of technological impact resulting from particular choices 8 .
Conclusions
The present analysis concerns important considerations on the external effects and the collateral effects accompanying the growth process in the modern economies. The occurrence of pecuniary knowledge externalities in the context in which technological knowledge arrives to the downstream sectors from external sources likely motivates further innovative initiatives with consequences in terms of a positive TFP dynamics. This last effect was not taken into account in the construction of the model of growth through creative destruction. In fact, the arrival of innovations from upstream sector is supposed to exercise the only influence on the downstream producers, by providing them with better qualities of intermediate goods and
consequently permitting for a more efficient production of final goods. Nevertheless, no further innovative outcomes are supposed to be obtained downstream. Moreover, technological impact from upstream to downstream sector should not be considered as a separate phenomenon, but rather as a mechanism mediated by the structure of market linkages and corresponding commercial relations.
The estimation results offered a significant support for the above argumentation.
Equation ( Moreover, the robustness analysis provided also the proof that the growth of TFP at the sector level cannot be considered as driven separately, neither by transactions, nor by pure technological influences. Especially this last aspect appears to have an important insight for past empirical studies that, in many cases without success, tried to detect the existence of pure technological spillovers.
